Description
It is said that deception among people in a civilized society is something to be loathed even though it seems to be part of human nature, but deception in war is a virtue. Properly designed and executed, stratagems reduce the horrific costs of war. This book is a comprehensive collection of classic articles on deception, hand-picked and expertly introduced by well-known experts on military deception. The purpose of this book is to set in motion a renaissance for using deception as an instrument of statecraft. The various sections are designed to cumulatively provide sufficient breadth and depth on the subject to satisfy both the novice as well as the expert. Packed with expert commentary, interesting background information, and original readings, this book provides the reader with sufficient knowledge to pursue General Eisenhower 's vision for the proper role of deception in support of the national interest.
Table Of Contents
Beware of the Dog; Intelligence Ethics ; On Simulation and Dissimulation ; The 8 Principles of Security and the 8 Principles of Deception ; Ruses and Stratagems of War ; The Problem of Deception ; Deception Maxims: Fact and Folklore ; The Principle of Naturalness ; Tactical Deception in Air-Land Warfare ; Meinertzhagen 's False Claim to the Haversack Ruse (1917) ; The Ultra Secret: Enigma Unwrapped; The Ultra Variations: A Review of Anthony Cave Brown 's Bodyguard of Lies ; Windowù as Written in Most Secret War ; The Psychology of Deception ; Killing No Murderù The Strategy of Indirect Approach ; Cognitive Factors in Deception and Counterdeception ; The Theory of Practical JokingIts Relevance to Physics ; Styles in Deception ; The Process of Deception ; Conditions Making for Success and Failure of Denial and Deception: Democratic Regimes ; Some Notes on the Organization of Deception (1944) ; The Actor 's Tale ; American Strategic Deception in the Pacific: 1942-44 ; A Pentagon Proposal to Continue a Deception Organization after; Catching NATO Unawares: Soviet Army Surprise and Deception Techniques ; The Red Mask: The Nature and Legacy of Soviet Military Deception ; Foreword to General Griffith 's Sun Tzu ; Stratagem: The Chinese View in the Sun Tzu ; Chinese Deception Doctrine: A View from Open Sources ; Now You See It, Now You Don 't: Camoufleurs, Conjurers and Pickpockets ; Biggest Hoax of the War: Operation FORTITUDE: The Allied Deception Plan that; Fooled the Germans about Normandy ; Soviet Deception in the Cuban Missile CrisisLearning from the Past ; The Barry and Thomas Critique of the Pentagon Report: In the Lessons and; Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo ; Denial and Deception Practices of WMD Proliferators: Iraq and Beyond ; Conditions Making for Success and Failure of Denial and Deception:; Nonstate and Illicit Actors ; The Evolution of a Revolt ; The Inherent Vulnerabilities of Technology: Insights from the National Training; Center 's Opposing Force ; Tactical Deception and Strategic Surprise in al-Qai 'da 's Operations ; How Can Weak Powers Win? ; How to Ambush a NATO Fortress ; High Desert Ambush: Hard Lessons Learned the Hard Way ; A Modern Day Trojan HorseùOperation JAQUE and the Use of Stratagem; in a Hostage Rescue Operation ; A Commander Improvises His Own Deception Planning Team ; Deception Planning in 145 Different Disciplines: Lessons from Behind Other Hills ; How to Cheat on Naval Tonnage Treaty Limits 1919-1939 ; Harwood and the First Deception of WWII, 1939 ; MiG SweepOperation BOLO ; Aerial Deception since the Second World War ; Detection of the B-2 Bomber and a Brief History on òStealth ' ; Night Action by Gideon at MorehPerhaps 1249 B.C. ; BCTP: Be Unpredictable, Take RisksOr Lose ; The Monkey 's Paw ; 1st Cav in Desert StormDeception, Firepower and Movement ; Deception Operations in REFORGER 88 ; Voices in the Sand: Deception Operations at the NTC ; OPFOR Counterreconnaissance at the National Training Center ; The Farewell Dossier: Duping the Soviets ; The One Percent Solution: Costs and Benefits of Military Deception ; Battle of the Gothic Line, 25 Aug 1944: Operation OLIVE ; Polyakov 's Run ; Counterintelligence (CI) vs. Counterespionage (CE) ; Counter-Deception Planning; Conclusion ;
Author
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Hy Rothstein
Hy Rothstein teaches in the department of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. He earned his Ph.D. in international relations from The Fletcher School at Tufts University. Barton Whaley is a visiting professor in the defense analysis department at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. He received his Ph.D. in political science from M.I.T.
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Barton Whaley
Barton Whaley is a visiting professor in the defense analysis department at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. He received his Ph.D. in political science from M.I.T.